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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACCIDENT 
COMPENSATION COMMISSION 1973: 
ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES 
John R Martin* 
Alongside the process of legislative review and enactment, questions of administrative structure 
and implementation received lively consideration.  At stake were such issues as whether to treat the 
new scheme as a matter of law reform or an aspect of social security.  ACC's eventual status as an 
independent commission posed challenges to public officials from several departments, while 
preserving certain tensions that would emerge later in the 1970s.  This paper credits the New 
Zealand public service for its creative response to implementing ACC, which required it to bridge 
the structural divides and alternative conceptions of how the new scheme might work.  The paper 
describes the pivotal decisions and persons that guided ACC into its initial decade. 
The five guiding principles can be summarised as . . . administrative efficiency.1 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Accident Compensation Act 1972 became law in the last days of the National Government 
that had been in office since 1949 (except for the brief interregnum of the Labour Government led 
by Walter Nash between 1957 and 1960). These two decades were a period of marked stability in 
New Zealand government (although, as discussed below, the signs of the turbulence that was to 
follow in the 1970s and 1980s were appearing by 1967). That stability was reflected in the role of 
the Public Service as the principal — but not the only — adviser to ministers and the vehicle 
through which policy was translated into administration. In this context an examination of the 
  
*  Teaching Fellow, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, and one-time Assistant 
Secretary, The Treasury and Deputy Director-General (Administrative), Department of Health (although, in 
both of the latter positions his contact with the ACC was minimal). The author is grateful to Maria Crequer 
(State Services Commission), Fiona Staples (Treasury) and staff of National Archives for assistance in 
locating departmental files. 
1  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1967) para 4 [Woodhouse Report]. 
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development of the Accident Compensation Act 1972 and the establishment of the Accident 
Compensation Commission (ACC) provides an informative case study of the "old" Public Service at 
work.2 It also raises questions about the choice of a public corporation, a quango, rather than a 
department as the institution through which a highly significant social policy initiative would be 
delivered.  
This article sketches the principal features of public administration in New Zealand thirty years 
ago; discusses the machinery of government issues that had to be resolved before the new 
compensation scheme could operate; describes the administrative challenges facing those charged 
with implementing the Accident Compensation Act 1972; and concludes with some reflections on 
the processes surrounding the birth of ACC. Specifically, the article examines three propositions, 
namely that: 
• the setting up of the accident compensation scheme, regarded at the time by ministers and 
officials as the largest administrative change (apart from mobilisation for war) since the Social 
Security Act 1938, was a considerable achievement of the "old" Public Service;3 
• the ACC, once established, was something of an "institutional orphan": while there are strong 
claims to parentage, no department of State was keen to accept the responsibilities of 
guardianship; and  
• relationships between the new Commission and departments, notably the central agencies, 
were coloured by a view that the ACC's "independence" had given it an unwarranted position 
of bureaucratic privilege.4  
This article examines these three propositions but first it is necessary to say a little about the 
political and administrative context of the period between the 1960s and the mid-70s. 
II THE CONTEXT 
A number of commentators identify 1967 as the turning point in New Zealand's post-war 
economic history.5 It was the year in which the currency was devalued for the first time since World 
  
2  The "old" Public Service refers to the administrative system prior to "New Zealand's bureaucratic 
revolution" of the 1980s. (Jonathan Boston and others Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic 
Revolution (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991)). 
3  There is something of a paradox here. Despite the significance of the new scheme, in both policy and 
administrative terms, there seems to have been very little interest outside those immediately involved and in 
the law. For instance, a fairly wide-ranging volume on social policy published in 1977 — Andrew D Trlin  
(ed) Social Welfare and New Zealand Society (Methuen, Wellington, 1977) — has no mention of the ACC. 
4  "A certain amount of jealousy existed in official circles about the independence of the Commission (and to 
some extent its staff) in carrying out what was viewed as a public function": Ian Campbell Compensation 
for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Its Rise and Fall (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1996) 48. 
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War Two following a collapse in the wool price; it saw the introduction of a series of techniques to 
halt the growth in public expenditure, including mini-budgets and staff ceilings in government 
departments; for the first time since the war there were more people unemployed (over 13,000) and 
on work schemes than there were vacancies; there was a significant net outward migration for the 
first time since the depression; per capita real income fell by two per cent; the Consumer Price 
Index jumped by six per cent; and Robert Muldoon became Minister of Finance.6 The era of "steady 
does it" associated with Keith Holyoake was ending.7 More starkly, it was the "end of the golden 
weather".8 
And yet this was a period in which the National Government launched two Royal Commissions 
with the potential to expand the welfare state, broadly defined: Woodhouse in 1967 and the 
McCarthy Commission on Social Security in 1972.9 Personal recollections suggest that at the heart 
of the bureaucracy these were seen as long-running rather peripheral exercises. The issues that 
preoccupied the "inner court" of officials in departments such as the Treasury, Trade and Industry 
and External Affairs were economic: increased production and diversification of the economy (the 
National Development Conference launched in 1968), the battle with "stagflation" built around 
incomes policies and price controls, and negotiations over British entry into the European Economic 
Community (which were on and off between 1961 and 1973). 
Turning now to the administrative context, it is useful to repeat the familiar encapsulation of the 
"old" Public Service: it was an apolitical, anonymous, merit-based, unified, career service operating 
within a long-standing framework of statute and convention. The McCarthy Commission of 1962 
and the State Services Act 1962 that followed did not alter these principles that had endured from 
the Public Service Act 1912.10 The New Zealand State services remained "bureaucratic" in the 
                                                                                                                                                                
5   See, for example, Brian Easton In Stormy Seas (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1997) and Gary R 
Hawke The Making of the New Zealand Economy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1985). A 
short-lived commodity boom in the early 1970s has tended to obscure this turning point and too often New 
Zealand's long "winter of discontent" is attributed to British entry into the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1973 and the first oil shock of 1973/74. Despite the impact of these events the problems of a small, 
pastoral economy with high expectations were already evident in the 1960s. 
6   Robert D (later Sir Robert) Muldoon was Minister of Finance between 1967 and 1972 and again between 
1975 and 1984. During the second period he was also Prime Minister. 
7   Keith J (later Sir Keith) Holyoake was Deputy Prime Minister, 1949-1957, briefly Prime Minister in 1957, 
and Prime Minister again from 1960 to 1972. 
8   John Gould The Rake's Progress: The New Zealand Economy Since 1945 (Hodder and Stoughton, 
Auckland, 1982) 113.  
9  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security "Social Security in New Zealand: Report of 
the Royal Commission of Inquiry" [1972] IV AJHR H 53. 
10  The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the State Services in New Zealand was chaired by Thaddeus P (later 
Sir Thaddeus) McCarthy, Justice of the Supreme Court, and reported in June 1962 (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1962).  It is often referred to simply as "McCarthy". (McCarthy also chaired the 1972 Royal 
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neutral, Weberian sense. In some respects McCarthy had inaugurated systems that were even more 
rule-bound than the arrangements previously in place: for example, in the complex wage-fixing 
procedures that led to some 140 occupational classes in the Public Service.11 This was the Public 
Service of the Public Service Manual and the Treasury Instructions and of uniform pay and 
conditions for the Public Servants employed by the State Services Commission (SSC). It was a 
Public Service that had grown from 23,000 in 1947 (when war-time temporaries were absorbed into 
the permanent staff) to 53,000 in 1972 when the Accident Compensation Act 1972 was passed. It is 
also worth noting again that between 1949 and 1972 the National Government was in office for all 
but three years. There was a strong sense of apolitical continuity in the relationship between 
ministers and officials. 
Post-1984 revisionist history has not given the "old" Public Service a good press. This is not the 
occasion to right the balance. It is useful, however, to make two points that relate to the ACC. The 
first is that this case study illustrates the capacity of the Public Service to implement major projects 
through the application of service-wide resources. Secondly, the Public Service in the post-war 
period was the institution through which a great deal of "nation-building" was accomplished; 
outstanding public servants were among those who contributed both design and construction effort 
to this task.12 
One aspect of this contribution is of enduring interest — the interplay between ministers and 
officials in initiating policy change.  Kenneth J Scott in 1955 suggested that in social welfare policy 
"the initiative is passing from the politicians to the administrators ... Formerly the initiative was 
clearly with politicians ... The turning point was in the latter half of the forties". He later amended 
his position to say "not that the initiative is passing to the administrators, but that it will pass to them 
when they grasp it";13 and that in welfare policy they were not in a position to do so. The position 
was different in health and education, he argued: there were "large and strong spending 
department[s] with a tradition of reviewing activities". In the absence of such an organisation and 
given a broad acceptance of the existing welfare structure by both political parties there were 
                                                                                                                                                                
Commission on Social Security.) The foundation of New Zealand's modern Public Service were established 
following the report of the New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Unclassified Departments of the 
Public Service "Public Service of New Zealand" [1912] IV AJHR H-34 — usually referred to as the "Hunt 
Commission" after the businessman, William D Hunt, who chaired it. 
11  The McCarthy Commission resumed twice, in 1968 and 1972, to review and fine tune the systems to give 
effect to the principle of "fair comparability".  
12  See Brian Easton The Nation Builders (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2001) and the Dictionary of 
New Zealand Biography (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1998) and (Department of Internal Affairs, 
Wellington, 2000) vols 4-5. 
13  Kenneth J Scott "Trends in Social Welfare Policies" in Kenneth J Scott (ed) Welfare in New Zealand (New 
Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Wellington, 1955) and (Oxford University Press, London, 
1955). 
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unlikely to be policy initiatives in the welfare field.14 The ACC initiative, as is discussed below, 
owes much to both ministers and senior officials but also, of course, to the contribution of the 1967 
Royal Commission. 
To some extent Scott's point about the absence of a strong bureaucratic voice with an overview 
of social policy remains valid for the period a decade later with which this article is concerned. At 
the departmental level the Social Security Department becomes the Department of Social Welfare 
only in 1972 as the Accident Compensation Act 1972 is passed.  Extending this line nearer to the 
present day, it might be observed that the administration of social policy in New Zealand from the 
1960s to the 1980s (and perhaps still to some extent) has suffered from problems of coordination. 
The Department of Social Welfare (before the restructuring of the last decade) despite some 
tentative attempts never exercised influence on the activity of the large spending baronies, Health 
and Education; Housing (in its various forms) and Maori Affairs also went their own way. The 
Treasury and the SSC were controllers rather than contributors to social policy formation. This was 
in sharp contrast to the domain of economic management where the Treasury was at least primus 
inter pares among departments  — and most of the time rather more — and the Officials Economic 
Committee an effective and long-standing coordinating mechanism.15  As an example of "the lack 
of integrated policy in the field of income maintenance in New Zealand" Geoffrey Palmer instances 
the introduction of the generous Muldoon superannuation scheme in 1976. "The development of two 
such programmes [ACC and National Superannuation] within five years shows the extent to which 
income maintenance can escape rational development and respond to political pressures".16  
The style of New Zealand government for most of the post-war period until the "revolution" of 
the 1980s was "mildly corporatist". Austin Mitchell in 1969 wrote about a "system which could 
perhaps be more accurately described as one of competitive group politics".17 Certainly that is how 
it appeared to the Public Service who were attuned to successive governments whose modus vivendi 
was to hold the ring and maintain a balance among conflicting forces and claims. Who were the 
contending groups in the ACC case? Palmer in a very useful survey discusses "three powerful 
interest groups vitally affected by the [Royal] Commission's proposals": the insurance industry, the 
legal profession, and the trade union movement.18  All certainly were engaged in extended 
interaction with officials in the policy process.  
  
14  Scott, above. 
15  For a discussion of the operation of the Officials Economic Committee see Bernard V Galvin Policy 
Coordination, Public Sector and Government (Victoria University Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 
Wellington, 1991). 
16  Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 316.  
17  Austin Mitchell Politics and People in New Zealand (Whitcombe and Tombs, Wellington, 1969) 33. 
18  Palmer, above, 115. 
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Of particular interest is the crossover between the legal profession as such and the law as 
represented among the Government's advisers. Apart from Woodhouse, Herbert R C Wild19 — 
whose statement dissenting from the 1963 report of the Committee on Absolute Liability20 was 
influential — and John C White21 were prominent Wellington practitioners before becoming 
Solicitor-General. Among the Ministers Josiah R Hanan22 and John R Marshall,23 who were both 
solicitors, played key roles (along with Thomas P Shand24) in promoting the development of ACC. 
Before the Commission itself among the many submissions by legal counsel those of the Law 
Faculty of Victoria University of Wellington were particularly significant. Given the influence of 
the legal profession on the development process, and despite the contrary direction taken by 
Woodhouse (see below), it is perhaps not surprising that the administration of ACC had a law 
reform rather than a social welfare emphasis. 
The career Public Service was, however, another strong influence — although they would 
undoubtedly cavil at the label of "interest group" — particularly Herbert L Bockett, Secretary of 
Labour 1947-64, and later a member of the Woodhouse Commission, and Dr John Robson, 
Secretary of Justice 1960-70.25 As Palmer notes these "[p]ublic servants were concerned that New 
Zealand, a country which prided itself on social welfare programmes, should be a laggard in the 
workers' compensation field".26 Another senior official who figured prominently in the early phase 
of post-Woodhouse discussions was the Chairman of the Social Security Commission (1963-71), 
George J Brocklehurst, who made extensive submissions proposing a pension scheme to replace 
common-law and workers compensation to be run by the Social Security Department — a 
  
19  Herbert R C (later Sir Richard) Wild, Solicitor-General from 1957 until appointed Chief Justice in 1965. 
20  New Zealand Committee on Absolute Liability Report of Committee on Absolute Liability (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1963). 
21  John C (later Sir John) White, Solicitor-General from 1966 until appointed as a High Court Judge in 1970. 
22  Hon Josiah R Hanan, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice 1960-69. 
23  Rt Hon John R (later Sir John) Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister 1957, 1960-72, Prime Minister 1972, 
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice 1954-57, Attorney-General 1969-71, Minister of Labour 1969-72. 
24  Hon Thomas P Shand, Minister of Labour 1963-69 (a farmer and an accountant by profession). 
25  Similar roles were played by senior officials in other policy areas, for example, by Clarence E Beeby in 
Education, Alexander R Entrican in the Forest Service, Bernard C Ashwin in the Treasury, and Alister D 
McIntosh in External Affairs. All were appointed at a young age while the first Labour Government was in 
office and remained for periods approaching and some exceeding 20 years.  
26  Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 69. 
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proposition which, despite a measure of support from Woodhouse and the "Commentary"27 fell out 
of the discussion as the scheme began to take legislative form.  
III MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT ISSUES 
Machinery of government issues did not figure prominently in any of the published documents. 
Nor does there appear to have been any structured discussion at the official level of the policy issues 
discussed below. By contrast a great number of public service hours were invested in 
"administration" in the sense of making the scheme work (as is also discussed later). 
A Welfare or Law Reform? 
The thoughts of Woodhouse on administration of the proposed scheme were brief and guided by 
the Commission's philosophy that the aim was "a unified and comprehensive scheme of accident 
prevention, rehabilitation, and compensation". While acknowledging that "the scheme outlined 
involves a partial merger with some aspects of the social security system" the Commission 
recommended that the scheme "should be brought to life and set upon its course by an independent 
authority whose whole responsibility it would be to ensure the successful application of [the] 
general philosophy". Clearly the attention to be given to accident prevention and rehabilitation was 
influential. The authority was, however, to "operate within the general responsibility of the Minister 
of Social Security and be attached to his Department for administrative purposes".28   
The Commission reported in December 1967. On 20 May 1968 the Government established an 
interdepartmental committee (IDC) chaired by the Secretary of Labour (Noel R Woods) and 
including the Solicitor-General (John White), the Social Security Commission (George J 
Brocklehurst) and the Treasury (Ross R Carroll).29 The committee's brief was to examine feasibility 
of a scheme and "any foreseeable problems or difficulties". The relationship between the new 
scheme and social security was high on the committee's agenda. The Social Security Department 
was concerned from the outset about "the evolving of a separate, major and more generous social 
security scheme for injury based on different principles from the basic social security scheme".30 In 
a memorandum of 26 July 1968 to the interdepartmental committee Brocklehurst said:31 
  
27  "Personal Injury: A Commentary on the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand" [1969] IV AJHR H 50 ["Commentary"]. 
28  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1967) 307. 
29  Cabinet Minute (20 May 1968) 18/8/88. 
30  George J Brocklehurst to Minister of Social Security (1 March 1968).  Copy on Treasury File T40/470/1 
(Archives New Zealand W2591). 
31   George J Brocklehurst, to Interdepartmental Committee (26 July 1968).  Copy on Treasury File T40/470/1 
(Archives New Zealand W 2591). 
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The department would wholeheartedly support any unified system of provision for incapacity which 
replaces the overlapping compensation of the present remedies now available ... It is agreed that the 
Social Security Department is the most appropriate to administer a system of injury benefits if only for 
the reason of interrelationship in the distribution of benefits and for economies in administration ... 
There would appear to be no insupportable difficulties in the establishment of a national monopoly and 
the appropriate administration to go with it if the framework is to lie with the Social Security 
Department. 
In a fascinating paper provided to the interdepartmental committee, Social Security crafted a 
discussion around the issues in the form of a "Socratic dialogue heavily used in the Greece of 
Pericles and as recently as the eighteenth century by Berkeley for written philosophical debate". The 
debate was between for, "a reasonable (not necessarily rational) man who gave his overall support to 
the scheme ...  Although he has considerable insight into the whys and wherefores of the scheme he 
is not a government nor a departmental man" and against, who "gives full vent in emotional and 
rational reactions to the suggestions of the scheme put forward by FOR". Despite the arguments put 
forward by Social Security the interdepartmental committee report was inconclusive on the 
administrative location (as on other issues) — perhaps because of pressure from the caucus 
committee also considering the Woodhouse report that officials should complete their report to a 
deadline.32 To the extent that the draft report seemed to envisage a degree of independence from 
departments the Treasury took exception:33 
In Treasury's understanding all the Committee's discussions up to this stage have been on the 
assumption that the administration of the scheme would be under the general jurisdiction of the Social 
Security Department, and no justification can be seen for setting up an entirely independent authority. 
On 8 April 1969 Cabinet agreed that the Government should draft a "White Paper" — 
hereinafter referred as the "Commentary" — without commitment.34  On machinery of government 
  
32  In a file note of 3 December 1968 (copy on Treasury File T40/470/1) Noel R Woods conveys the Minister's 
instruction that the interdepartmental committee report is to be available promptly to the caucus committee. 
33 Ross Carroll to the interdepartmental committee 7 January 1969 (Treasury File T40/470/1). Treasury's 
position throughout the ACC establishment process can be described not unfairly as a "watching brief". 
Ross Carroll was an experienced Divisional Director but from the files he seemed to reflect a Treasury 
position that so long as there was no direct cost to the revenue — for benefits, administration, or to the state 
as an employer — the Treasury should not oppose. The Secretary (1968-76), Henry G Lang, was concerned 
that ACC payments should be taxable and was asked to appear personally before the caucus committee but 
there is no evidence that he did. Nor did the Treasury make submissions to the Gair Committee (Labour, 
Social Security, Justice, and Health made submissions "generally in favour", and Inland Revenue and 
Transport on specialised issues (Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social 
Change in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979)). 
34 "Personal Injury: A Commentary on the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation in 
New Zealand" [1969] IV AJHR H 50 ["Commentary"]. 
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matters the "Commentary" noted that "the Commission chose instead [of a public/private option] to 
create a new institution in the form of the authority and to use the existing Social Security 
Department to assist the authority to carry out its functions".35  It went on to note that the authority 
must be linked with its main servicing department at a level and in such a way that will ensure to the 
department a proper say in the discharge of the responsibilities that it will be carrying out for the 
authority.36 And later, almost incidentally, in a discussion of the relationship between the new body 
and a range of agencies, "[t]he responsibilities of the Social Security Department will be increased 
as it will be the main payment and servicing organization assisting the authority".37  By the end of 
the "Commentary" it is, however, beyond doubt that the Social Security Department is assumed to 
be "the main servicing agent".38  
Just before the 1969 General Election the "Commentary" was referred by Parliament to an ad 
hoc select committee ("the Gair Committee"), which reported in October 1970. On substantive 
policy matters this committee was clearly crucial. On the nature of administrative responsibility for 
the recommended scheme it confined itself to saying that "[t]he prime responsibility for 
administration of the compensation matters will lie with a new statutory authority ... [which] will 
comprise three Commissioners and the necessary staff and will have the degree of independence 
proposed by the Royal Commission." Recognising that the role of insurance companies remained an 
open question (and not favouring compensation business being placed as a monopoly with the State 
Insurance Office (SIO)), the Select Committee referred to a choice to be made between the authority 
having its own staff or being serviced by the Social Security Department if insurance companies 
were not to be involved. The links to Social Security were still alive — but only just.39 
By 1970 there was a clear shift in the thinking of the National Government away from setting 
the Woodhouse proposals in a social welfare context. Palmer quotes an undated Labour Department 
memorandum "strongly opposed" to Social Security responsibility:40 
This proposal is a proposal of insurance. As insurance it would be accepted by a great many people who 
would have a substantial objection to extension of the Social Security system and Social Security 
principles into this field. 
  
35 "Commentary", above, para 278 (emphasis added). 
36  "Commentary", above, para 281. 
37  "Commentary", above, para 286 (emphasis added). 
38  "Commentary", above, para 310. 
39  Select Committee on Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand "Report of Select Committee on 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand" [1970] AJHR I 15. 
40  Quoted in Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New 
Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 77. 
258 (2003) 34 VUWLR 
Before the select committee there was strong criticism on behalf of a Railways union of any 
suggestion that the scheme would be administered by Social Security. And one Member of 
Parliament (a supporter of Woodhouse) regarded "this social security business" as a "red herring".41  
The emphasis of Woodhouse on the prevention function, in which the Department of Labour had the 
principal (but not exclusive) role, was probably also a factor. Furthermore, the future shape of the 
social security system was itself now the subject of inquiry by a Royal Commission.  Whatever the 
reasons, the 1971 Cabinet Committee on Compensation for Personal Injury and its advisers, the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Compensation — the "Perry Committee"42 — seem to have 
proceeded on the basis that the new independent body would operate outside the social security 
arrangements. (Social Security was not a permanent member of the Perry Committee.) Increasingly 
the scheme was being portrayed principally as a matter of law reform. 
B Decentralisation 
Apart from any broad policy considerations, the question which seemed to be crucial in 
determining a "home" for the new authority was "whether the scheme is to be administered centrally 
as in Ontario, or, if not, the extent to which it should be run on a decentralised basis".43 The 
differences between Ontario and New Zealand were highlighted but significantly the "Commentary" 
opined that "[d]ealing by mail with an abstract entity in Wellington may not be acceptable in the 
New Zealand environment".44 This, it will be recalled, was a time when most government 
departments had an extensive and hierarchical network of regional and district offices throughout 
the country.  
The claimed advantages of a decentralised form of administration underpinned the working 
assumption in the "Commentary" that local offices of Social Security (by 1974 numbering 29 in 
major centres and 19 in smaller towns) would not only act as recipients of claims but would also "be 
in a position to learn about any particular personal problems an individual claimant might have 
relating to their injury, treatment or compensation".45  In Ontario "reliance on the concentration of 
  
41  Palmer, above, 93. 
42  Andrew R Perry LLB had recently been appointed Deputy Secretary of Labour, after a lengthy period as 
Secretary to the Cabinet; he was formerly a senior officer of the Department of External Affairs. Others on 
the committee were George S Orr, Deputy Chairman, SSC (and later Secretary of Justice), Ross R Carroll 
(Divisional Director, Treasury), A J Edwards, Deputy Secretary of Transport), and Bruce J Cameron 
(Assistant Secretary, Justice). J G Hamilton, a very experienced member of the Law Drafting Office, was 
responsible for the prolonged exercise of translating the new scheme into statute. The committee met 
throughout 1971 and 1972. 
43 "Personal Injury: A Commentary on the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation in 
New Zealand", [1969] IV AJHR H 50 ["Commentary"]. 
44  "Commentary", above. 
45  "Commentary", above, para 301. 
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computer processing in head office is regarded as an essential feature of the highly centralised 
system". But the "Commentary" was confident that "it is now possible to combine the benefits of a 
centralised computer operation with the benefits of partial decentralisation, although this might be 
more costly than total centralisation". These were still the early days of computerisation: only in 
1972 was the Computer Services Division brought within the State Services Commission.46 
Overshadowing the place of Social Security was the role to be played by the insurance 
companies. If, contrary to the proposals of Woodhouse and the "Commentary", they were to act as 
agents of the new authority, the functions of either Social Security or a new network of 
compensation offices would be reduced. The Gair Committee and the National Government 
(through the passage of the 1972 Act until electoral defeat at the end of 1972) kept the door open for 
the insurance companies and it was the newly-established Accident Compensation Commission that 
in March 1973 recommended to the Kirk Government that "in the initial stages" the State Insurance 
Office (SIO) should be the sole agent for receiving claims under the new scheme.47  
The procedures followed by the SIO are well summarised by Ison.48 While straightforward 
claims could be dealt with by the SIO a wide range of claims were referred to ACC Head Office. In 
Ison's view, "[a] serious problem with this structure is that it can deny procedural due process". He 
also comments "that there may be some difficulty in reconciling, within the same management 
structure, the social service objectives of the ACC with the profit objectives of the SIO".49  As early 
as 1980 the decision-making authority of the regional offices opened in 1976 was being extended, 
and a "pilot" branch office had been established in Dunedin.50  
Whether or not the administrative efficiency and client responsiveness of the ACC would have 
been enhanced if the originally proposed links with Social Welfare (formerly Social Security) had 
been maintained is a question that invites speculation. Palmer suggests that a Social Security 
estimate of 600 additional staff frightened the Gair Committee but notes that by 1978 the ACC had 
almost 500 staff and the SIO had recruited an additional 100 staff.51  Palmer also concludes, "in 
retrospect an ordinary department of state would have been better, as long as benefits were defined 
with clarity and insulated from all possibility of political or ministerial direction in the 
  
46   The Treasury purchased the first computer in the 1950s; for a brief period centralised services were under 
the Department of Internal Affairs. 
47  State Insurance Office to State Services Commission (22 March 1973) SSC File SSC11/1/10/1 (Archives 
New Zealand W2702). 
48  Terence G Ison Accident Compensation (Croom Helm, London, 1980) 80-89. 
49   Ison, above, 89. 
50  Ison, above, 90. 
51  Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 382. 
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determination of claims".52 This judgment was perhaps as much influenced by constitutional 
considerations of ministerial responsibility and public accountability as a calculation of possible 
efficiency gains.  
C The ACC Quango 
Polaschek in 1958 regarded "the proper sphere of the public corporation as opposed to the 
department of State" as one of the "big questions" of New Zealand public administration.53  He 
noted that for all New Zealand's experience with non-departmental forms of organisation "New 
Zealanders have not speculated much on the place that they might advantageously occupy in 
government. Neither have they followed ascertainable principles in deciding when to set up a 
corporation or company instead of the 'customary' department".54 The ACC experience would not 
have altered that judgment. 
"Independence" was the cornerstone of the proposed Woodhouse arrangements. The 
"Commentary" said:55 
There are two conflicting aims involved in the management of the Commission's scheme. The authority 
must be independent of the Government of the day in the exercise of its wide discretionary powers. On 
the other hand the very wide range of duties encompassed in the scheme requires public accountability 
for the broad administration of the scheme and for the adequacy of the legislation under which the 
authority operates. It appears that there are several bodies whose statutory organisation might constitute 
a precedent for the resolution of the conflicting requirements of the independence of the authority in its 
administration of the legislation and the responsibility of a minister to Parliament. 
As noted earlier, the Gair Committee had little to say about these matters and broadly supported 
the "degree of independence" proposed by Woodhouse. Hansard likewise records little 
parliamentary interest. C C A McLachlan, Chairman of the second select committee (that 
considered the Accident Compensation Bill) simply observed that the committee had sought "to 
avoid the unnecessary establishment of a new top-heavy organisation".56    
There is little evidence in the departmental files that the institutional provisions of the 1972 Act 
in this area were controversial. Apart from the standard sections requiring the presentation to the 
  
52  Palmer, above. 
53 Raymond J Polaschek Government Administration in New Zealand (New Zealand Institute of Public 
Administration, Wellington, 1958); (Oxford University Press, London, 1958) 56. 
54  Polaschek, above. 
55  "Personal Injury: A Commentary on the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand" [1969] IV AJHR H 50, para 281 ["Commentary"]. 
56  C C A McLachlan MP (3 October 1972) 381 NZPD 2993. 
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House of Representatives of an annual report and audited accounts, there was also section 20 
requiring the Commission "to give effect to the policy of the government in relation to those 
functions and powers as communicated to it from time to time in writing by the Minister". In early 
drafting this read "to have regard to ...".  Of more contention was the draft provision requiring 
salaries and conditions of the Commission's staff to be determined "in agreement" with the SSC. It 
was argued that the expression "in consultation with" had "proved unsatisfactory in the past".57  
Ministers asked for this to be reconsidered: they had "some reservations ... because this [agreement] 
implied that the State Services Commission would fix the salaries of officials of the Accident 
Compensation Commission".  "With the concurrence of" was agreed upon.58  
In the event, the SSC view seems to have prevailed; section 24C of the 1972 Act provided that 
salaries and allowances were to be set within "scales fixed by the Accident Compensation 
Commission in agreement with the State Services Commission or by the Minister in the absence of 
agreement". 
D Ministerial Responsibility 
A point that is worthy of recording is the statutory location of agency responsibility for the 
administration of the Accident Compensation Commission Act 1972. In the principal Act the 
notation is that "This act is administered in the Department of Labour". In the 1975 Reprinted New 
Zealand Statutes59 the Department of Labour was replaced by the Accident Compensation 
Commission. 
The Minister of Labour, however, remained the responsible Minister throughout. (Palmer 
attributes this to the historical accident of Thomas P Shand, as Minister of Labour, being the initial 
advocate within the government).60 This immediately raises the question of responsibility to 
Parliament for the new Commission. Initially — prior to the 1973 inclusion of the non-earners' 
scheme — the ACC required no contribution by the taxpayer. Parliamentary accountability through 
an opportunity for debate in the House was provided by the inclusion of an amount for the 
chairman's salary under Vote Labour. When the non-earners' scheme was introduced in 1973 a 
significant contribution from the Consolidated Revenue Account was required to fund the 
Supplementary Fund. This was found in Vote Social Welfare Programme II: Monetary Benefits. 
The result is the unusual (but not unique) situation that a minister was responsible for the 
  
57  (21 September 1971) CPI(71)M6. 
58  (12 November 1971) CPI(71)M4. 
59  Reprinted New Zealand Statutes (1975) Vol 2 1409-1657. 
60  Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 383. 
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expenditure of funds from the Vote of another minister, a situation that the Treasury at least, some 
years later, found uncomfortable.61  
No control is exercised over that expenditure, or over related policy matters, by the Department of 
Social Welfare. It points out that it has neither the staff, resources, nor the expertise, to act as an adviser 
to Government in respect of the Accident Compensation Commission. It also notes that its Minister has 
no responsibility for the Commission. 
The Accident Compensation Commission Act provides that the Minister of Labour is the Minister in 
Charge of the Commission and he is formally responsible for the Commission, both in Parliament and 
Cabinet. However, his Department has only limited involvement with the Commission (in the area of 
industrial safety) and is unable to provide the Minister with any independent advice on the 
Commission's wider activities. 
The present position is, therefore, one in which no agency of government has either the resources or the 
responsibility for providing independent advice or policy and financial issues arising out of the activities 
of the Accident Compensation Commission. Treasury exercises some overview in the course of its 
responsibilities towards Vote Social Welfare. However, if no one is aware of the need to refer financial 
matters to Treasury, even that overview is not available. 
The Treasury argued that the Vote and ministerial responsibility should be brought together and 
set out various arguments for and against Social Welfare and Labour respectively. The Minister of 
Finance referred the report to the Cabinet and the funding provision was transferred to Vote Labour 
from 1980/1981. 
Ison provides an outsider's view:62 
One handicap in the rational development of the system is the lack of a portfolio into which the 
ministerial responsibility for the ACC will neatly fit. The Minister of Labour is responsible for 
ministerial functions in relation to the ACC, but that tends to be a crisis portfolio. A Minister of Labour 
is usually pressed to spend his time on the bush fires of labour relations rather than undertaking the 
contemplation necessary for system reform in areas for which there is no appearance of urgency. The 
Ministry of Social Welfare has sometimes been mooted as a more appropriate portfolio, but any transfer 
of ministerial responsibility there might create a risk of individual needs and floor-level income support 
coming more into focus, with a consequential loss of the role of the state in administering income 
insurance beyond floor level.  
 
The ACC was established in accordance with the statutory template that with variations applied 
to other non-departmental bodies. On the one hand, dealings with individual citizens were beyond 
 
61  Treasury to Minister of Finance (14 January 1980) File T40/470/1 (Archives NZ W2591). 
62  Terence G Ison Accident Compensation (Crown Helm, London, 1980) 188. 
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ministerial intervention. On the other, there was the capacity in the statute for the government of the 
day to play the deciding role in such important specific matters as levy rates and maximum amounts 
of compensation (section 15) and generally to require the ACC "to give effect to the policy of the 
government in relation to those functions and powers as communicated to it from time to time in 
writing by the Minister" (section 20). There is, however, an important question that can only be 
answered by those who have a close acquaintance with the way in which the relationship between 
the Commission and ministers evolved over the next 30 years. That is the degree to which 
"independence" was exercised. Palmer in 1979 was of the view that the Commission's 
"independence from Government is more apparent than real".63  Nonetheless it is clear that in the 
first decade both politicians and the central agencies were less than enamoured of the ACC's 
performance — and for the officials at least the Commission's distance from the core Public Service 
was a factor in this dissatisfaction. 
IV THE ESTABLISHMENT CHALLENGE 
The SSC in commenting on the remuneration to be paid to the new Commissioners 
acknowledged that they were to be responsible for a "vast undertaking of establishing a major new 
public corporation starting virtually without accommodation, established procedures, handbooks, 
experienced staff etc".64  A perusal of departmental files provides ample confirmation of that 
statement. It also supports the observations made by ministers in the House, and by outside 
observers at the time, that the Public Service displayed great industry and dedication in tackling this 
large administrative task. Dr A M Findlay, Opposition spokesman on ACC, on the third reading of 
the Bill spoke of "the dedicated assistance on the part of officials", singling out Perry in particular, 
and cited an American professor who "expressed amazement at the amount of work we expected to 
get and received from higher public servants".65  
The Labour Department was at the centre of the service-wide official preparation for the 
establishment of the ACC. In October 1970 it expressed the view (in a draft cabinet paper) that "So 
far as can be seen ... the Select Committee's report does not raise legislative or administrative 
problems that cannot be resolved in the normal way".66 The "normal way" was an interdepartmental 
committee chaired by Labour — it met first on 21 December 1970 under the chairmanship of  
E G Davey, Secretary of Labour — and comprised representatives of the Treasury, SSC, the 
Department of Justice and the Ministry of Transport. Very quickly a series of working parties was 
set up to prepare operating procedures that could be in place by 1 October 1973. A number of 
  
63  Palmer, above, 383. 
64  SSC to Chairman, Cabinet Committee on State Services (25 September 1972) SSC File SSC3/6/33 
(Archives NZ W3005). 
65 Dr A M Findlay, MP (30 October 1972) 380 NZPD 2250. 
66  Copy on Treasury file T40/470/1 (Archives NZ W2591).  
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retired senior public servants were recruited to assist: L M Graham (former Assistant Director-
General of Education, later ACC Commissioner), B C Magill (former Assistant Commissioner of 
Works) and G Armstrong (formerly solicitor, Public Trust Office).67 The range of issues to be 
considered and the number of departments involved was very extensive. Forms were drafted, 
manuals prepared, accounting procedures defined. At the same time the IDC was considering the 
policy issues on which Cabinet direction (through the Cabinet Committee on Accident 
Compensation — chaired by the Minister of Labour, initially John R Marshall and then D S 
Thomson) was necessary before legislation was ready for introduction into the House.  
In the event an incomplete Bill was introduced on 15 December 1971 — 29 further clauses were 
added by supplementary order papers while the Select Committee was considering the Bill.  The 
IDC officials (principally A R Perry and his Labour colleagues) provided advice to the Committee. 
The Act was passed on October 1972 just prior to the November General Election in which Labour 
led by Norman Kirk defeated the National Government of John R Marshall. At that point the 
Accident Compensation Commission becomes the principal adviser to the Government68 although 
the Treasury continued to advise against the inclusion of non-earners (funding for which, by annual 
appropriation from the Consolidated Revenue Account, was not determined until 10 September 
1973).69  
Several issues deserve further attention. The first is the delay in the inauguration of the scheme. 
The working assumption of officials had been 1 October 1973. This was always regarded as tight. 
For example, an SSC file note acknowledges that "[a] close watch will have to be kept on progress 
so that if necessary the Commission can assist the Labour Department in a "salvage operation" to 
meet the deadlines."70 Two months after their appointment the new Commissioners wrote to the 
minister (H Watt) saying that they had:71 
  
67  Armstrong had responsibility, at least in the early stages assisted by B Banks (later Crown Counsel), of 
Labour for the drafting of legislation. 
68 The first Commissioners, K L Sandford (a Hamilton solicitor), J L Fahy (Regional Controller, Auckland, 
IRD, and A R Perry (understood to be a temporary appointment "in view of the fact that it had not been 
possible, in the time available, to obtain the services of an accountant from the private sector" and later 
replaced by L M Graham) were invited by National (27 November 1972, CM 72/48/31) and their 
appointments confirmed by Labour (20 December 1972, CM 72/53/11). 
69  CM 73/42/14. In an internal note to Assistant Secretary J D Lang, Carroll, the Treasury's officer principally 
concerned with ACC from the outset, notes "[t]he attached cabinet minute indicates that there are going to 
be difficulties with the new Government in maintaining the previously accepted principle that the Accident 
Compensation Commission should be self-financing on a fully funded basis". 
70  A C Davis (2 June 1972) SSC 3/6/33 (Archives NZ W3005). 
71  Sandford to Minister (22 February 1973). Copy on Treasury File T40/470/1 (Archives NZ W2591). 
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regretfully, but not unanimously, concluded that the compensation schemes cannot be introduced on 1 
October 1973 ... [W]e have not only considered the physical possibility of commencing on that date, but 
have also regarded it as important that the schemes should be able to begin in an atmosphere of 
administrative efficiency, to a level acceptable not only to Government, but perhaps more importantly to 
injured persons and the public generally.  
Among the matters that concerned the Commission were: the absence of any permanent senior 
staff — the response to advertising for six directors had been "extremely disappointing" the question 
— of appointment of agents remained unresolved,72 the Commission was studying in depth the 
rating question, legislative amendments (for instance, on the definition of "personal injury by 
accident") were necessary, and fees payable to the medical profession were still being negotiated. 
The proposed date of 1 April 1974 was accepted by the Government. 
Recruitment of senior staff was clearly a problem for the new Commission. The appointment of 
a Medical Director was of considerable importance and the New Zealand Medical Association 
(NZMA) took a close interest. The Chairman of the NZMA Council was the redoubtable Dr (later 
Sir) Randal Elliott who conveyed to the Minister the view that a substantially higher salary than was 
on offer was going to be required. The Minister, because of the need to maintain relativity with 
departmental and hospital doctors, could only reply that he felt "that from a practical viewpoint, the 
Commission would not be able to offer a salary matching, or even approaching the income of a 
highly successful distinguished doctor in private practice". Sandford in submitting a draft reply to 
the minister conceded that he believed that there was "some validity" in the point made by Dr 
Elliott.73 This was a period marked by double figure inflation, constraints such as the Stabilisation 
of Remuneration Regulations, and a persistent claim that the state sector was "leading" pay 
increases.  The problem of recruitment of professional staff was common across the state sector. 
One issue decided, but not without argument, was where the head office of the new commission 
should be. The Chairman of the SSC (IG Lythgoe) personally held a strong view that the ACC 
should be established in Christchurch. Writing to the Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on State 
Services on 30 June 1972, Lythgoe said:74 
The Commission has found that once an organisation is established in Wellington it is difficult to 
transfer because of its entrenched position; it has established relations with other bodies; staff have 
purchased homes; and very good reasons are advanced for staying in Wellington. 
  
72  Among other considerations, the ACC mentioned the criticism that appointment of the SIO in a monopoly 
position would give that organisation an unfair advantage in other fields of insurance.  The Treasury copy 
has the marginal comment by the Minister of Finance, Wallace (Bill) E Rowling: "so what!" T 40/470/1 
(Archives NZ W2591).  
73  AACT 62 Box 1A Ministerial Correspondence 1973-76 (Archives NZ AACT 62 Box 1A). 
74  SSC File 3/6/33 (Archives NZ W3005). 
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Perry expressed "grave reservations" and Lythgoe accepted that the high policy content of the 
ACC's work in the establishment phase could justify a Wellington headquarters but that 
Christchurch might later be considered for processing. On behalf of the yet to be established 
Accident Compensation Commission, the Government Accommodation Board (a branch of the 
SSC) proceeded to lease space in Feltex House, Sturdee Street, Wellington.  
A corollary of the introduction of ACC (and an exercise proceeding in parallel with 
establishment of the Commission itself) was the consequential change for the Government as an 
employer.75 From February 1972 a Joint State Services Coordinating Committee/Combined State 
Services Organisation (SSCC/CSSO) working party laboured over the myriad of amendments 
needed in state sector conditions of employment and such matters as insurance cover on official 
travel that were the responsibility of the Treasury (and recorded in the Treasury Instructions). The 
140 occupational classes in the Public Service coupled with the particular conditions applying to 
Railways, Post Office, Ministry of Works and New Zealand Forest Service wage workers made this 
a complex and time-consuming exercise. The files suggest that, unlike concurrent disputes over 
state sector pay, relations between the employing authorities and the state unions over ACC matters 
were relatively amicable. The atmosphere was no doubt assisted by the unions' strong support for 
the Woodhouse proposals.76 
Despite the early difficulties of recruitment within the bounds set by relativity of pay scales with 
the Public Service, Campbell judges that:77 
in the early days the morale of the staff was very high, as they considered themselves privileged to be 
taking part in such an innovative experiment. Over time, however, disenchantment set in, and much of 
this must be laid at the door of the commissioners.  
Whatever the reason, there is the purported evidence of a joint ACC/SSC management audit carried 
out at the request of the Government in 1978. In the words of the Chairman of the Labour and 
Education Select Committee (A G Malcolm) reporting back to the House in 1980 the Bill replacing 
the Commission by a Corporation:78 
The State Services Commission said that there was a complete lack of internal communication in the 
Accident Compensation Commission, that there was total confusion between administration and policy, 
  
75  Apart from the Treasury, there was no dissent from the proposition that the Crown should be bound by the 
ACC legislation. The Treasury favoured the Crown continuing to carry its own risk.  
76  The Public Service Association (PSA) registered minor key objections to the establishment of the ACC 
outside the public service but did not press the issue (PSA Newsletter (29 March 1972). 
77  Ian Campbell Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Its Rise and Fall (Auckland University 
Press, Auckland, 1996) 48. 
78  Quoted by Campbell, above, 53. Campbell asserts that "it was certainly not correct to state that the 
commissioners did not speak to each other". 
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that the internal structure was such that various divisions reported to separate commissioners who often 
did not speak to each other, which has led to internal separation of divisions, a lack of liaison, in the 
commission, and poor staff relationships ... I make no bones about the fact that the Government is 
putting a stick of dynamite under the top management structure. 
V CONCLUSION  
It is now possible to offer some tentative conclusions on the themes set out at the beginning of 
this article: 
Was there adequate preparation for the ACC by the "old" Public Service? The judgment at the 
time was favourable at least in terms of dedicated effort. Reading the files leads to the conclusion 
that the ACC establishment was an illustration of what the Public Service in its heyday was good at. 
There was a high degree of cooperation among departments to put in place the Government's policy. 
A vast amount of experience and expertise was devoted by the senior Public Service to resolve 
difficult policy issues and to enable the new Commission (when formed) to have the foundation of 
operational systems. The delay from 1 October 1973 to 1 April 1974 does not invalidate this 
conclusion. 
Was the ACC in its early years something of a "bureaucratic orphan"? There is no question but 
that the Department of Labour ushered the Commission into existence in a diligent and committed 
manner. Between 1972 and 1975 Labour lost its status as the agency formally charged with the 
administration of the Accident Compensation Act 1972. With Perry temporarily and then Graham as 
commissioners the institutional memory of the Department of Labour may be presumed to have 
passed to the ACC. Certainly there is no indication that Labour saw itself as being "responsible" for 
the Commission or ACC policy. Social Welfare was clearly taken out of any principal role after the 
1970 Gair Committee even though the appropriation for the supplementary fund was on Vote Social 
Welfare from 1974/1975. Equally, there is some evidence to support the suggestion that the 
Commission was, not surprisingly, jealous of its independence; this sensitivity was matched by a 
certain distancing of the SSC and the Treasury from the new Commission.  
Was there some sense of alienation on the part of the control agencies? The State Services 
Commission (SSC) played a generally benign role in the establishment process but points of tension 
can be discerned, particularly in the SSC's role in pay fixing and exchanges over accommodation 
and remuneration of commissioners. The Treasury was from the outset focused on the objective — 
which was lost — that there should be no charge on the Consolidated Revenue account. It also 
sought successfully a position of influence in the investment of the ACC funds.79 The initiative for 
acceptance in the institutional family would need to come from the new Commission. 
  
79 The Treasury also thought that the ACC would need its own actuarial advice "but the Commission tends to 
be a bit sensitive over such matters" (Ross Carroll to J D Lang (28 March 1973) T 40/470/1 (Archives NZ 
W2591)).  
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Are there lessons to be learned from the machinery of government choices made, notably the 
establishment of the ACC as a quango rather than within the departmental framework? In retrospect 
it seems that there was surprisingly little rigorous analysis devoted to these issues. Given the 
conviction on the part of ministers that ACC was a law reform rather than a social policy initiative 
the move away from Social Welfare as the "parent" department was understandable. But other 
departments did not have the national network and payments experience of Social Welfare offices.  
It is tempting to think that the early years of the scheme might have been smoother if there had been 
a closer association with a department. "Hiving off" the scheme into a public corporation or, in 
current terminology, a Crown entity could have constituted a second phase. Certainly the 
arrangements established for ministerial responsibility and public accountability were not 
particularly coherent but the experience of the past few years with Crown entities (such as the 
Tourism Advisory Board, the Lotteries Commission and the Fire Services Council) suggests that the 
ideal model has not yet been found.80 The extent to which other administrative paths might have 
been followed with advantage is perhaps a question to which those with greater experience of later 
decades might attempt an answer. 
 
80  For a discussion of the confused accountability arrangements for Crown entities see Controller and Auditor-
General Governance Issues in Crown Entities (Government Printer, Wellington, 1996). 
